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Abstract 
In Leviathan, Hobbes outlines the concept of the ‘Kingdome of God by Nature’ or ‘Naturall 
Kingdome of God’, terms rarely found in English texts at the time. This article traces the concept 
back to the Catechism of the Council of Trent (1566), which sets forth a threefold understanding 
of God’s kingdom—the kingdoms of nature, grace, and glory—none of which refer to civil 
commonwealths on earth. Hobbes abandons this Catholic typology and transforms the concept of 
the natural kingdom of God to advance a claim often missed by his interpreters: Leviathan-states 
are the manifestation of a real, not metaphorical, kingdom of God. This argument plays a key 
role in Leviathan, which identifies the kingdom of God as the Christian doctrine most subject to 
abuse. Hobbes harshly criticizes Catholic and Presbyterian clergy for claiming to represent 
God’s kingdom. This claim, he argues, comes with the subversive implication that the church 
possesses spiritual and temporal authority, and caused great turmoil during the English Civil 
War. As an alternative, Hobbes points to civil commonwealths as the manifestation of God’s 
natural kingdom, which is the only form his kingdom currently takes.  
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1. Introduction 
A decade after Leviathan’s publication, the event prompting it—the English Civil War—was 
over and the monarchy restored. As controversy continued to surround Leviathan due to its 
religious views, Hobbes tried to explain to England’s new king his reason for writing it. This 
explanation appears in a 1662 letter to Charles II, sometimes referred to as An Apology for 
Himself and His Writings. Here Hobbes stresses that the purpose of Leviathan was to correct 
pernicious interpretations of the kingdom of God:  
It was written in a time when the pretence to Christ’s kingdom was made use of for the 
most horrid actions that can be imagined; and it was in just indignation of that, that I 
desired to see the bottom of that doctrine of the kingdom of Christ, which divers 
ministers then preached for a pretence to their rebellion: which may reasonably 
extenuate, though not excuse the writing of it.1   
 
It is significant that Hobbes describes his motivations in these terms. The letter reveals that, for 
Hobbes, a primary reason for writing Leviathan was to counter subversive interpretations of the 
kingdom of God—a point often absent from accounts of why he wrote it.2 Because of the vicious 
political acts pursued in the name of Christ’s kingdom, he felt compelled to clarify this Christian 
doctrine, and Leviathan is the result. 
 Passages from Leviathan confirm that these concerns were at the forefront of Hobbes’s 
mind when he wrote it, not simply a post hoc explanation for Charles. In the text, Hobbes writes: 
‘The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either consequent, 																																																								
1 Thomas Hobbes, Seven Philosophical Problems, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury 
(hereafter EW), vol. 7, ed. William Molesworth (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845), 5. 
2 Part of the reason why is that studies most likely to make this point—namely, those emphasizing Hobbes’s interest 
in the kingdom of God—generally neglect his 1662 letter to Charles. See, e.g., J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Time, History and 
Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes’, in Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and 
History (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 148–201; Joel Schwartz, ‘Hobbes & the Two Kingdoms of God’, Polity 18, 
no. 1 (1985): 7–24; and Meirav Jones, ‘ “My Highest Priority Was to Absolve the Divine Laws”: The Theory and 
Politics of Hobbes’ Leviathan in a War of Religion’, Political Studies 65, no. 1 (2017): 248–63. Studies on the 
reception to Leviathan and Hobbes’s efforts to fend off charges of atheism give more attention to the 1662 letter. 
See, e.g., Philip Milton, ‘Hobbes, Heresy and Lord Arlington’, History of Political Thought 14, no. 4 (1993): 501–
46; Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in 
England 1640–1700 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 222–24; and Jon Parkin, ‘Baiting the Bear: 
The Anglican Attack upon Hobbes in the later 1660s’, History of Political Thought 34, no. 3 (2013): 421–58. 
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or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in 
the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being dead, 
are to rise again at the last day’.3 This passage and the letter to Charles show Hobbes’s enduring 
concern over the doctrine of the kingdom of God being perverted for political ends. When sects 
claim to represent God’s kingdom, they imply that ultimate authority rests with them, not the 
civil sovereign. This belief, Hobbes worries, inevitably leads to political turmoil. 
As part of his efforts to counter such views, chapter 31 of Leviathan presents a twofold 
understanding of God’s kingdom:  
(1) The prophetic kingdom of God, which exists at two points in time—ancient Israel and 
after Christ’s return—when God rules directly over a chosen people through his 
prophetic word; and 
 
(2) The natural kingdom of God or kingdom of God by nature, where God rules not 
through prophecy but the law of nature.4  
 
With the prophetic kingdom closed off at present, Hobbes points to Leviathan-states as the 
manifestation of God’s current kingdom—the natural kingdom of God. It is an interpretation of 
God’s kingdom that renders it compatible with, rather than a threat to, civil authority.  
 This article argues that Hobbes’s interpretation departs from previous understandings of 
the natural kingdom of God and plays a key, often overlooked role in his political philosophy. 
Many interpreters characterize the kingdom of God as a metaphor for the Leviathan-state.5 A 
close reading of De Cive and Leviathan, however, reveals that Hobbes makes a more radical 
claim: civil commonwealths are the manifestation of a real, not metaphorical, kingdom of God—
specifically, the natural kingdom of God. Obscuring this point has been insufficient attention to 																																																								
3 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3:960. 
4 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:554–56. 
5 See Bryan Garsten, ‘Religion and Representation in Hobbes’, in Leviathan, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010), 539; Robin Douglass, ‘The Body Politic “is a fictitious body”: Hobbes on Imagination and 
Fiction’, Hobbes Studies 27, no. 2 (2014): 144; Meirav Jones, ‘ “My Highest Priority Was to Absolve the Divine 
Laws” ’, 255; and Alison McQueen, Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 138. 
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the concept of the natural kingdom of God before Hobbes. Only by uncovering its earlier 
meaning do the ways that Hobbes alters it come into view. 
With that goal in mind, this article traces the intellectual history of the natural kingdom of 
God, locating its origins in Catholic thought. The concept appears in the Catechism of the 
Council of Trent and writings of the Catholic theologian Robert Bellarmine as one of three 
different forms that God’s kingdom takes. In these contexts, God’s kingdom of nature refers to 
all his creation. Next the article turns to why certain understandings of God’s kingdom strike 
Hobbes as politically dangerous. In his view, the Catholic Church introduced the subversive 
belief that the church represents the kingdom of God and, as such, has authority in temporal 
matters. This belief migrated to Presbyterian theology, causing great upheaval during the English 
Civil War. After explaining this context, the article examines Hobbes’s alternative understanding 
of God’s kingdom, which includes the natural kingdom of God. In contrast to the concept’s 
meaning in Catholic thought, Hobbes describes this natural kingdom as manifesting itself on 
earth as civil commonwealths. He is not, however, always consistent in describing the exact 
nature of this relationship. Sometimes Hobbes describes the natural kingdom of God as existing 
before the Leviathan-state, which then more fully realizes this kingdom. Elsewhere he suggests 
that the Leviathan-state serves necessary functions for bringing this kingdom into existence. The 
presence of both these views in Hobbes’s writings, I argue, ultimately sheds insights into the 
priorities in his political thought. 
 
2. The natural kingdom of God before Hobbes 
Though Hobbes makes no mention of the natural kingdom of God in The Elements of Law, the 
concept appears in his next major political works, De Cive and Leviathan. Hobbes first mentions 
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the term in chapter 15 of De Cive, ‘De Regno Dei per naturam’, and then in chapter 31 of 
Leviathan, ‘The Kingdome of God by Nature’ (‘De Regno Dei Naturali’ in the Latin edition). 
These chapters do not provide many clues on the concept’s origins, since they never reference 
other texts using it. Hobbes does frequently mention biblical references to the kingdom of God 
(or Christ or heaven), and dedicates numerous sections of Leviathan to clarifying their meaning 
(e.g., chapters 31, 35, 40–44, 47). But the specific term natural kingdom of God does not appear 
in scripture. Since Hobbes never identifies any origins for this term, it can give the impression 
that he coins it. 
The term does not appear to have been in wide use when Hobbes wrote. A search of 
‘kingdom of God by nature’ or ‘natural kingdom of God’ (and spelling variants) in Early English 
Books Online finds these terms in none of the over 130,000 texts in its collection, except for 
writings by Hobbes and contemporaries responding to Leviathan.6 Notably, the concept also is 
missing from statements of Anglican and Presbyterian doctrine from the period. The Thirty-Nine 
Articles of the Church of England, a summary of its core doctrines finalized in 1571, make no 
mention of the natural kingdom of God or kingdom of God generally.7 The concept of the 
kingdom of God takes a more prominent role in doctrinal statements from the 1640s marked by 
Presbyterian influence—the Westminster Confession, Shorter Catechism, and Longer Catechism. 
But, like the Thirty-Nine Articles, these statements never mention the natural kingdom of God. 
When explaining the second petition of the Lord’s Prayer (‘Thy kingdom come’), the Shorter 
Catechism only refers to the kingdoms of grace and glory. ‘In the second petition’, the catechism 
																																																								
6 Search of Early English Books Online, https://eebo.chadwyck.com/home, January 4, 2018. What appears before 
Hobbes’s political writings is the term ‘kingdom of nature’ in the same typology for God’s kingdom found in the 
Tridentine Catechism (discussed below). See, e.g., William Sparke, The Mystery of Godlinesse: A Generall 
Discourse of the Reason that Is in Christian Religion (Oxford, 1628), 43.  
7 Church of England, The Thirty-Nine Articles, in Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition, ed. 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2:526–40.  
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reads, ‘we pray, that Satan’s kingdom may be destroyed; and that the kingdom of grace may be 
advanced, ourselves and others brought into it, and kept in it; and that the kingdom of glory may 
be hastened’.8  
The kingdoms of grace and glory also appear in explanations of God’s kingdom in the 
Catechism of the Council of Trent, or Tridentine Catechism, from 1566. What this Catholic 
catechism contains—but drops out in the Westminster Catechism—is discussion of the kingdom 
of nature as a third form of God’s kingdom. So before Hobbes, one can trace the concept of the 
natural kingdom of God back to Catholic thought.  
When explaining the second petition of the Lord’s Prayer, the Tridentine Catechism 
advances a threefold understanding of God’s kingdom—namely, of nature, grace, and glory. The 
kingdom of nature refers to God’s ‘providence which rules over all things’.9 In other words, the 
kingdom of nature is God’s rule over all creation. The kingdom of God also can mean ‘that 
special and singular providence by which God protects and watches over pious and holy men’, 
which is the kingdom of grace.10 Whereas the kingdom of grace refers to God’s rule over 
Christians in a fallen world, the kingdom of glory refers to God’s perfect kingdom that will 
arrive with Christ’s return.11   
 Importantly, this threefold understanding of God’s kingdom never refers to civil 
commonwealths now on earth. Augustine’s City of God perhaps best reflects this view in 
Catholic thought. For Augustine, no commonwealth represents the kingdom of God or what he 
calls the heavenly city: ‘While this Heavenly City … is on pilgrimage in this world she calls out 
																																																								
8 Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Shorter Catechism, in Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian 
Tradition, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2:662.  
9 Council of Trent, The Catechism of the Council of Trent (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1934), 522.  
10 Council of Trent, The Catechism, 523. 
11 Council of Trent, The Catechism, 524–25. 
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citizens from all nations and so collects a society of aliens, speaking all languages’.12 Prior to 
Christ’s return, ‘the two cities’—earthly and heavenly—‘are intermingled’.13 This influential 
account of the heavenly city refuses to deify and equate earthly kingdoms with God’s.  
Not all have followed Augustine’s approach. For instance, the Emperor Constantine’s 
favorable treatment of Christians raised expectations that earthly and divine kingdoms would 
become one.14 But despite occasional bursts of enthusiasm for particular rulers, this view has 
remained a marginalized position in Catholic thought.15 The political realm’s imperfections 
undermine claims that it represents God’s perfect kingdom. The Tridentine Catechism avoids 
any such equivalency: regardless of what form God’s kingdom takes—nature, grace, or glory—it 
cannot be reduced to a civil commonwealth. 
Hobbes’s references to the kingdom of God in Leviathan show his familiarity with earlier 
formulations of it. He reproduces the Westminster Shorter Catechism’s twofold understanding of 
God’s kingdom—the kingdoms of grace and glory—in chapter 35 on ‘the Signification in 
Scripture of Kingdome of God’. He writes: ‘The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines … 
is taken most commonly for Eternall Felicity, after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they 
also call the Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) Sanctification, 
which they terme the Kingdome of Grace’.16 Chapter 35 does not mention the kingdom of 
nature, but chapter 31 does. Though Hobbes’s description of the natural kingdom of God departs 
from Catholic thought, his mention of a rarely used concept also found in the Tridentine 
Catechism suggests his familiarity with its account of God’s kingdom.  																																																								
12 Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 19.19. 
13 Augustine, City of God, 19.26. 
14 See Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine, trans. H.A. Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). 
15 See Benedict Viviano, The Kingdom of God in History (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1988); and Catholic 
Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Washington, DC: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2000), 
676. 
16 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:634. 
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Moreover, Hobbes read Bellarmine, whose writings reference the typology for God’s 
kingdom found in the Tridentine Catechism. After the Protestant Reformation, Bellarmine 
became the Catholic Church’s leading theologian in countering Protestant beliefs. When 
explaining the second petition of the Lord’s Prayer, Bellarmine closely follows the Tridentine 
Catechism and reproduces its threefold understanding of God’s kingdom.17 Hobbes likely came 
across some of these references to the natural kingdom of God. After all, the detailed criticism of 
Bellarmine in chapter 42 of Leviathan makes clear that Hobbes studied his writings closely.18 
This interest in Bellarmine provides further reason to believe that Hobbes was familiar with the 
Catholic understanding of God’s kingdom. 
 
3. The root source of ‘Darknesse in Religion’  
In his chapter on the natural kingdom of God in Leviathan, Hobbes begins by framing it as a 
guide to balancing one’s obligations to God and the civil authority. He aims to chart a path that 
can ‘avoyd both these Rocks’ of either offending God through ‘too much civill obedience’ or 
transgressing ‘the commandments of the Common-wealth’ through ‘feare of offending God’.19 
By framing the chapter in this way, Hobbes raises a concern made explicit later in Leviathan: 
many understandings of God’s kingdom fail to clarify our obligations and instead ‘causeth … 
great … Darknesse in mens understanding’ over whom to obey.20 Before we look at the 
understanding of God’s kingdom developed by Hobbes, it first is helpful to examine what he is 
																																																								
17 Robert Bellarmine, De bonis operibus in particulari, in Ven. Cardinalis Roberti Bellarmini Politiani S.J. Opera 
omnia (hereafter Opera omnia), vol. 6, ed. Justinus Fèvre (Paris: Vivès, 1873), 402; and Dichiarazione piu copiosa 
della dottrina cristiana, in Opera omnia, vol. 12 (1891), 298. 
18 See also James Hamilton, ‘Hobbes’s Study and the Hardwick Library’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 16, 
no. 4 (1978): 445–53. 
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:554. 
20 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:960. 
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reacting against. Doing so provides insights into his strategy for correcting dangerous 
interpretations of God’s kingdom, as well as why he sees this task as so urgent. 
Parts III and IV of Leviathan go through an extensive list of theological positions that 
Hobbes finds fault with. Out of all of them, he singles out misinterpretations of the kingdom of 
God as the ‘greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either 
consequent, or subservient’.21 Similarly, when listing those doctrines ‘contrary to the Peaceable 
Societies of Mankind’, he starts with the ‘Error’ that ‘the present Church now Militant on Earth, 
is the Kingdome of God’.22 This view is at the core of what Hobbes condemns as ‘Darknesse in 
Religion’, which encourages disobedience to civil authority and rebellion.23 
 According to Hobbes, it is a dangerous mistake to understand God’s kingdom as an 
earthly entity distinct from the civil commonwealth. The kingdom of God offers benefits, like 
eternal life, that exceed anything that an earthly commonwealth can provide. Churches and sects 
that claim to embody God’s kingdom arrogate to themselves an authority with subversive 
ramifications. For once a church becomes perceived as God’s kingdom on earth, its perceived 
power surpasses that of the civil authority, which dashes any hope of unified sovereignty and 
peace. As Hobbes observes, ‘men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to 
the Soveraign Power, will bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the 
Laws, and thereby overthrow the Common-wealth, and introduce confusion, and Civill war’.24 
Indeed, for Hobbes, the ‘most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian 
Common-wealths’ is perceived conflict between civil and divine commands.25  
																																																								
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:960. 
22 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1104. 
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1106. 
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:850. 
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:928. 
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 Clearly for Hobbes, debates over God’s kingdom are not mere theological exercises but 
come with high political stakes. When people believe that the present church is the kingdom of 
God, those perpetrating the error reap for themselves ‘worldly benefits’, like the right to govern 
the church and commonwealth.26 The belief that one embodies God’s kingdom ultimately leads 
to claims of both spiritual and temporal authority. 
 Hobbes identifies ‘the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy’ as the ‘Authors … of this 
Darknesse in Religion’ that conflates the church with God’s kingdom.27 Not coincidentally, 
Behemoth’s opening discussion of the causes of the English Civil War mentions these groups 
first when listing those responsible for corrupting the people and disposing them to rebellion.28 
On Hobbes’s view, subversive interpretations of God’s kingdom originated in the Catholic 
Church and spread to the Presbyterians and other sects, resulting in political upheaval.  
When confronting the claim that the church represents the kingdom of God, Hobbes often 
focuses on its source, Catholic theology. That point is evident from Leviathan’s longest chapter 
(42), which is dedicated to showing Bellarmine’s errors, among them his interpretation of the 
kingdom of God. It is a shrewd strategy for persuading mostly Protestant readers in England. 
Hobbes undermines claims that the church represents God’s kingdom by showing that this belief 
originates in a source that many of his readers reject—the Catholic Church.   
 In his rebuttal of Catholic doctrine, Hobbes focuses on Bellarmine because he makes ‘as 
strongly as is possible’ the case for the pope’s ‘Supreme Ecclesiasticall Power’.29 Compared to 
other defenders of papal authority, Bellarmine takes a moderate position, which is why Hobbes 
finds his arguments more compelling (while still rejecting them). Bellarmine denies that the pope 																																																								
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1104. 
27 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1106. 
28 Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 2–3. 
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:866. See also Patricia Springborg, ‘Thomas Hobbes and Cardinal Bellarmine: Leviathan and 
“The Ghost of the Roman Empire” ’, History of Political Thought 16, no. 4 (1995): 503–31. 
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has supreme temporal authority. Instead, his concept of potestas indirecta—‘indirect power’—
provides the basis for the pope’s authority to intervene in temporal matters. While granting civil 
sovereigns supreme temporal power, Bellarmine argues that the pope’s supreme spiritual 
authority on earth grants him indirect power in temporal matters. This power permits political 
intervention when necessary to achieve spiritual ends, as Bellarmine explains: ‘since the end of 
the spiritual government is the attaining of eternal life, which is the supreme and ultimate end to 
which all the other ends are subordinated, it is certainly necessary that every temporal authority 
be subjected and subordinated to the spiritual authority of the supreme ecclesiastical bishop’.30 
When souls are at stake, the pope’s ‘authority extends … to temporal matters’, even to the point 
of being able to depose sovereigns, argues Bellarmine.31  
 Given its political implications, Hobbes still finds this moderate interpretation of papal 
authority dangerous. He identifies Bellarmine’s view that ‘the present Kingdome of God [is] 
administered by the Pope’ as one of the flaws in his account of papal authority.32 According to 
Bellarmine, Christ has an eternal and spiritual kingdom, whose vicar on earth is the pope until 
Christ’s return.33 As the head of this spiritual kingdom, the pope possesses supreme spiritual 
authority on earth and indirect temporal power. But Hobbes calls this spiritual kingdom 
supposedly headed by the pope a sham: ‘Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: 
for it is the same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which … is not of this world; but shall be in 
the next world, at the Resurrection’.34 Christ’s kingdom has not yet come according to Hobbes, a 
view that deprives the pope of a spiritual kingdom to rule. 																																																								
30 Bellarmine, On the Temporal Power of the Pope. Against William Barclay, in On Temporal and Spiritual 
Authority, ed. and trans. Stefania Tutino (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), 161.  
31 Bellarmine, On the Temporal Power of the Pope, 304. See also Stefania Tutino, Empire of Souls: Robert 
Bellarmine and the Christian Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9–47. 
32 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:976. 
33 Bellarmine, Controversia de summo Pontifice, in Opera omnia, vol. 2 (1870), 148–51. 
34 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:918. 
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Beyond its political ramifications, the Catholic Church’s claim to embody God’s 
kingdom also endangers individuals’ spiritual well being, argues Hobbes. On the basis of his 
purported spiritual authority, the pope could command subjects to depose a king deemed 
heretical to safeguard their souls and protect them from false doctrines. For Hobbes, though, 
such a command has the opposite effect because it requires violating the laws of nature, which 
are God’s laws.35 The principal law of nature, Hobbes stresses, is ‘that we should not violate our 
Faith, that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns’.36 Disobeying the sovereign puts 
one’s salvation in jeopardy, since ‘the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to … the disobedient, or 
transgressors of the Law’.37 By encouraging rebellion, Catholic teaching on God’s kingdom 
inflicts twofold harm: it makes individuals liable to earthly and heavenly punishments. 
Hobbes also sees this dangerous interpretation of God’s kingdom in Presbyterian 
theology. Few examples better illustrate what Hobbes loathes about Presbyterian theology than 
Scottish reformer Andrew Melville’s speech to King James VI in 1596. In this famous challenge 
to James’s spiritual authority, Melville declares that Christ gives authority over his kingdom to 
the church and its ministers, not the king: 
[T]here is King James, the head of this commonwealth, and there is Christ Jesus, the 
King of the church, whose subject James the Sixth is, and of whose kingdom he is not a 
king, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member. Sir, those whom Christ has called and 
commanded to watch over his church, have power and authority from him to govern his 
spiritual kingdom both jointly and severally; the which no Christian king or prince should 
control and discharge, but fortify and assist; otherwise they are not faithful subjects of 
Christ and members of his church.38 
 
																																																								
35 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:922. 
36 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:932. 
37 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:930. 
38 Thomas M’Crie, Life of Andrew Melville, new ed. (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1899), 181. 
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Melville and other Presbyterians embraced a conception of Christ’s spiritual kingdom that 
divided earthly sovereignty between church and king. For Hobbes, that view inevitably leads to 
political strife. 
What occurred at the Westminster Assembly further explains why Hobbes singles out the 
Presbyterians for criticism. Hobbes calls the Assembly’s actions, backed by Parliament, a 
‘crime’ because they ‘alter[ed] the Church-government … without the King’s authority’.39 
Presbyterians’ strength in Parliament during the Civil War—a fact Hobbes bemoans40—was a 
key factor leading it to call this assembly of clergy to develop reforms for the Church of the 
England. Since Charles I refused to authorize it, many clergy supportive of the established 
doctrines and episcopal structure of the Church of England did not participate, and their absence 
only heightened Presbyterian influence.41 That influence is evident in the resulting Westminster 
Confession, which adopts the very position Hobbes warns against—belief that the church is the 
kingdom of God. This confession from 1647 states: ‘The visible church, which is also catholic or 
universal under the gospel (not confined to one nation as before under the law) … is the kingdom 
of the Lord Jesus Christ’.42 For Hobbes, such teaching contains the seeds of rebellion because it 
locates supreme spiritual authority in an entity (the church) distinct from any ‘one nation’. 
Similarly, the confession places in the hands of church ‘officers the keys of the kingdom of 
heaven’, giving them power over who can enter this kingdom.43 In Leviathan, Hobbes rejects this 
position, saying that the keys of the kingdom of heaven discussed in Matthew 16:19 belong to 
																																																								
39 Hobbes, Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion, of Thomas Hobbes, in EW, vol. 4, 
ed. William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1840), 418.  
40 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1226.  
41 For more on the history of the Westminster Assembly, see Robert Paul, The Assembly of the Lord: Politics and 
Religion in the Westminster Assembly and the ‘Grand Debate’ (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985).  
42 Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith, in Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian 
Tradition, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2:638. 
43 Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith, 2:644. 
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‘all Supreme Pastors’, that is, ‘all Christian Civill Soveraigns’.44 If this awesome power rests 
with the church rather than the sovereign, Hobbes fears, people will give their ultimate loyalty to 
the former—a recipe for civil war.      
So from Hobbes’s perspective, Presbyterians used the Westminster Assembly to smuggle 
dangerous Catholic beliefs on God’s kingdom into the Church of England. Presbyterians just 
differ from Catholics in their belief of who constitutes the true church. Hobbes cannot help but 
note the irony of Presbyterians, known for their anti-Catholic fervor, embracing Catholic 
teaching on the kingdom of God: ‘[I]n those places where the Presbytery took that Office, though 
many other Doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this Doctrine, that 
the Kingdome of Christ is already come, and that it began at the Resurrection of our Savior, was 
still retained’. Presbyterians retain this doctrine, adds Hobbes, ‘to have a Soveraign Power over 
the People’.45 The allure of power keeps Presbyterians from rejecting what Hobbes identifies as 
the most pernicious Catholic doctrine. 
Once unleashed into the political sphere, beliefs about representing the kingdom of God 
have the potential to spread and take various forms. Hobbes observed this development on full 
display during the English Civil War, as Presbyterian doctrines encouraged more extreme sects. 
This ‘brood of their own hatching’, writes Hobbes, became a ‘dangerous … enemy to the 
Presbyterians’.46 One such sect named by Hobbes, the Fifth Monarchy Men, pointed to the 1649 
execution of Charles I as a sign of the imminent arrival of Christ’s kingdom on earth, at which 
point they would rule as God’s elect.47 In this way, groups used apocalyptic beliefs about the 
																																																								
44 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:872.  
45 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1106.  
46 Hobbes, Behemoth, 136. 
47 William Aspinwall, A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy Men (London, 1653). See also B.S. Capp, The 
Fifth Monarchy Men (London: Faber & Faber, 1972). 
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kingdom of God to challenge the sovereign’s authority and claim it for themselves.48 As with the 
Catholics and Presbyterians, Hobbes shows little sympathy for apocalyptic sects.49 He calls the 
Fifth Monarchy Men ‘fanatics’50 and condemns them for promoting bloodshed and political 
strife during the Civil War.51  
In short, when writing and reflecting on English politics during the 1640s and 1650s, 
Hobbes encounters an environment filled with competing claims over the kingdom of God—how 
it manifests itself, when it will be fully realized, and most critically who represents it and thus 
should have spiritual authority on earth. These claims often undermine civil authority, and in 
Hobbes’s view contributed to the war that engulfed England.52 He concludes that neutralizing 
these challenges to the civil sovereign requires a different understanding of the kingdom of God, 
one suited for promoting political stability rather than rebellion. Let’s turn now to the alternative 
developed by Hobbes. 
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4. Hobbes’s understanding of the kingdom of God  
What stands out about Hobbes’s conception of the kingdom of God is that it abandons existing 
typologies. The Tridentine and Westminster Catechisms distinguish the forms of God’s kingdom 
based on whom God rules: all creation in the kingdom of nature, the church militant in the 
kingdom of grace, and the church triumphant (after Christ’s return) in the kingdom of glory. In 
contrast, Hobbes develops his typology of God’s kingdom based on how God communicates law 
to his subjects. Chapter 31 of Leviathan states: ‘God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the 
Dictates of Naturall Reason, by Revelation, and by the Voyce of some man…. From hence there 
ariseth a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a 
triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith’. After outlining these forms that 
God’s word can take, Hobbes adds: ‘As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, 
or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in 
that manner’.53 Since God does not communicate universal laws through supernatural sense, the 
kingdom of God can take two forms corresponding to the ways he does communicate law, 
through reason and prophecy. So in contrast to the Tridentine and Westminster Catechisms, 
Hobbes attributes to God the following twofold kingdom: (1) the natural kingdom of God, where 
laws are communicated through reason; and (2) the prophetic kingdom of God (sometimes called 
the kingdom of God by pact),54 where laws are communicated through prophecy (see Table 1). 
 At present, possible manifestations of God’s kingdom are further limited because God no 
longer communicates his laws through prophecy according to Hobbes, which precludes the 
prophetic kingdom of God. Hobbes’s view on miracles leads to this conclusion. In the prophetic 
kingdom of God, ‘the operation of Miracles … procureth credibility’ for the prophet who 																																																								
53 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:556. 
54 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:572, 3:636. 
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delivers God’s word as law.55 For Hobbes, performing a miracle is necessary for ‘a true Prophet 
… to be known’.56 But by declaring ‘Miracles now cease’, Hobbes concludes that ‘we have no 
sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; 
nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy 
Scriptures’.57 Without miracles, it is impossible to establish the truth of prophecy, and therefore 
prophecy cannot function as universal law and the prophetic kingdom of God cannot exist. 
 But such a kingdom did exist in the past. On Hobbes’s reading of scripture, the prophetic 
kingdom of God began with God’s covenant with Abraham to rule over the Jewish people.58 In 
this kingdom, ‘God was King, and the High Priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole 
Viceroy, or Lieutenant’.59 The prophetic kingdom of God then ceased to exist when the Jews 
rejected God’s direct rule and elected Saul king.60  
This past kingdom of God was a ‘Civill Kingdome’, which will be ‘restored by Christ’, 
writes Hobbes.61 He describes Christ as ‘both God that spake and the Prophet to whom he 
spake’.62 Since Christ is God and man, his future kingdom clearly fits Hobbes’s definition of a 
prophetic kingdom of God—namely, one where God communicates his prophetic word as law 
through the ‘Voyce of some man’.63 Hobbes stresses that Christ’s kingdom will be ‘a reall, not a 
metaphoricall Kingdome’ on earth. This kingdom has not yet come, which Hobbes takes as self- 
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Table 1: Comparing Hobbes’s understanding of God’s kingdom with competing views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Conceptions of the kingdom of God 
 
Kingdom of 
nature/Natural 
kingdom of God 
 
Kingdom of grace 
 
Kingdom of glory 
 
Prophetic kingdom 
of God 
Catechism of the 
Council of Trent 
(1566) 
 
‘[T]he words, 
kingdom of God, 
have a variety of 
significations…. 
 
 
 
 
‘In their ordinary 
sense … the words, 
kingdom of God, 
signify not only that 
power which God 
possesses over all 
men and over the 
entire universe, but, 
also, His providence 
which rules and 
governs all things…. 
 
 
 
 
‘[Christ] reigns over 
those who are 
endowed with a 
superior faith, hope 
and charity, and 
have yielded 
themselves pure and 
living members to 
God. It is in these 
that the kingdom of 
God's grace is said 
to consist…. 
 
 
 
 
‘[T]he kingdom of 
glory … is 
perfect…. Then shall 
all that is defective 
and unsuitable be 
utterly removed … 
God Himself will 
then reign in our 
souls and bodies’. 
 
 
 
 
NA 
Westminster 
Shorter 
Catechism (1647) 
 
‘In the second 
petition, which is, 
“Thy kingdom 
come”, we pray, 
that Satan’s 
kingdom may be 
destroyed; 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
‘and that the 
kingdom of grace 
may be advanced, 
ourselves and others 
brought into it, and 
kept in it; 
 
 
 
 
‘and that the 
kingdom of glory 
may be hastened’. 
 
 
 
 
NA 
Leviathan (1651) 
 
‘[T]here may be 
attributed to God, 
a twofold 
Kingdome… 
 
 
‘Naturall, wherein 
he governeth as 
many of Mankind as 
acknowledge his 
Providence, by the 
naturall Dictates of 
Right Reason; 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
‘And Prophetique, 
wherein … he 
governed [one 
nation] … not only 
by natural Reason, 
but by Positive 
Lawes, which he 
gave them by the 
mouths of his holy 
Prophets’. 
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evident from the second petition of the Lord’s Prayer, ‘Thy kingdom come’.64 Christians pray for 
this prophetic kingdom of God to arrive, but for now it remains closed off to them. 
Though Hobbes shuts the door on the prophetic kingdom of God at present, he shows the 
way to the natural kingdom of God. This kingdom is governed by the laws of nature, which 
anyone with reason can learn.65 When describing the natural kingdom of God, Hobbes rejects the 
Tridentine Catechism’s view that this kingdom refers to God’s rule over all creation: 
[T]o call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onlely to Man, but also to 
Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a 
metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his 
Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning 
them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are 
not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as 
his.66  
 
To reign, God must have subjects who understand his laws and the rewards and punishments tied 
to them. Due to this criterion, the natural kingdom of God is limited to human beings.  
Hobbes further narrows the scope of the natural kingdom of God by excluding from it 
atheists and those who deny God’s providence ‘because they acknowledge no Word for his’.67 
Those failing to recognize God’s laws are not subjects but ‘Enemies’.68 These restrictions leave 
only a subset of humanity in the natural kingdom of God—those believing in God. In this regard, 
Hobbes departs from Catholicism’s more expansive view of God’s natural kingdom. 
Though atheists have no place in Hobbes’s natural kingdom of God, it is a mistake to 
conclude that it is necessarily a Christian kingdom. In his natural kingdom, God communicates 
law through reason rather than prophecy. But reason alone cannot establish many Christian 
doctrines—including that most central for Hobbes, ‘Jesus is the Christ’—based on revelation 																																																								
64 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:642. 
65 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:932. 
66 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:554. 
67 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:554. 
68 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:556. 
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preserved by the Christian tradition. Nothing in God’s word contradicts reason but things in it are 
‘above Reason’, notes Hobbes.69 Therefore, as he writes elsewhere, ‘nature does not suggest to 
us that the Scripture is the law of God’.70  
If reason does not lead automatically to the Christian faith, what does it say about 
worshipping God in his natural kingdom? For Hobbes, reason leads to belief in God, which 
provides an explanation of ‘a First, and an Eternall cause of all things’.71 It also leads to 
recognition of God’s authority in his natural kingdom and the obligation to obey and honor him 
due to his ‘Irresistible Power’.72 Reason therefore shows that God exists and demands worship, 
but exactly what God is and how to worship him are questions to which reason lacks direct, 
determinate answers. Instead, the laws of nature provide an indirect answer: an authoritative 
arbiter must resolve these questions to avoid confusion and conflict over worship. Hobbes argues 
that such an arbiter is found in the civil sovereign, whose temporal and spiritual authority 
extends to establishing laws on the proper manner of worshipping God.73  
This solution makes room in the natural kingdom of God for practices at odds with 
standard Christian understandings of God’s kingdom. A sovereign could command subjects to 
engage in idolatry, and they would be obligated to obey says Hobbes.74 Idolatry is consistent 
with the natural kingdom of God when the sovereign commands it. Since reason demands belief 
in God, there are some restrictions on what the sovereign can command. Atheism and pouring 
																																																								
69 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:576. 
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‘insults upon God’ are off limits in the natural kingdom of God.75 But these limits hardly make 
the implications of Hobbes’s view less controversial. By giving the sovereign broad discretion 
over religion, Hobbes crafts a conception of God’s kingdom where not only Christianity but also 
idolatry can flourish.  
This aspect of the natural kingdom of God bolsters the civil sovereign’s authority and fits 
with Hobbes’s overall political philosophy, while also proving controversial. In Hobbes’s natural 
kingdom of God, the gap between the divine and civil law largely disappears. The sovereign has 
wide latitude in determining what God’s law commands, and can go so far as commanding 
idolatry, in which case subjects would have an obligation to obey. This possibility creates a 
jarring juxtaposition—idolatry in God’s kingdom. Predictably, contemporary critics like John 
Bramhall take Hobbes to task for defending an understanding of God’s kingdom that prioritizes 
obeying man over God.76 Hobbes certainly gives his readers plenty of fodder for reaching this 
conclusion. In Leviathan’s chapter on the natural kingdom of God, he cites Acts 5:29—‘It is 
better to obey God than man’—and advises that this precept ‘hath place in the kingdome of God 
by pact, and not by Nature’.77 This portrait of the natural kingdom of God places such emphasis 
on obeying the civil authorities that it raises the worry of pushing God to the side. Indeed, in his 
efforts to render the kingdom of God safe for politics, Hobbes leaves himself vulnerable to the 
criticism that he mangles it beyond recognition.  
Debates over the kingdom of God in the 1640s and 1650s help explain his decision to 
formulate an alternative open to this risk. In response to the havoc encouraged by subversive 
																																																								
75 Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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understandings of the kingdom of God, Hobbes looks to develop a view compatible with all 
aspects of the civil sovereign’s authority. Toward that end, he eliminates opportunities in the 
natural kingdom of God for churches and sects to challenge the sovereign’s religious commands, 
even those demanding idolatry. 
 
5. More than a metaphor 
Among Hobbes scholars, there is a tendency to overlook the Leviathan-state’s connection to the 
natural kingdom of God and focus instead on its connection to the prophetic kingdom of God. As 
a result, they often reduce the relationship between God’s kingdom and the Leviathan-state to a 
metaphor. Bryan Garsten writes that, for Hobbes, ‘it was the kingdom of men that was 
“metaphorical”: the metaphor was between the rule of man and the rule of God’.78 Robin 
Douglass also emphasizes parallels between God’s kingdom and the Leviathan-state: ‘Hobbes 
insisted that the kingdom of God on Earth will not return until the second coming of Christ, but 
the fiction that he cast of the mighty Leviathan might appear to be a close approximation. 
Ironically, men living under such a mortal God could be deceived into thinking that the kingdom 
of God has come’.79 Alison McQueen comes to a similar conclusion: ‘The state that emerges 
[from the state of nature] is a secular mirror image of the Kingdom of Christ’.80 And, relatedly, 
Meirav Jones argues that the ‘historical kingdom of God over Israel … was utilized by Hobbes 
as a source of ideas not only about kingdoms of God, but about commonwealths more 
generally’.81 On all these accounts, the Leviathan-state has features resembling the prophetic 
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kingdom of God—either the historic kingdom of Israel or Christ’s future kingdom—which is 
distinct from calling it the actual kingdom of God.   
There are parallels between the Leviathan-state and what Hobbes understands as the 
prophetic kingdom of God. But accounts focused on these parallels prove incomplete, for they 
fail to recognize the more direct link between the Leviathan-state and natural kingdom of God. 
Importantly, Hobbes’s account of the natural kingdom of God in De Cive and Leviathan 
identifies the Leviathan-state as a concrete form that God’s present kingdom takes.  
His description of worship in the natural kingdom of God illustrates this point. In the 
natural kingdom of God, argues Hobbes in Leviathan, ‘Reason directeth not only to worship God 
in Secret; but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men. And this … Publique 
Worship … is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, 
cannot be said to be a Publique Worship’.82 De Cive explains why worship must be public and 
uniform in God’s natural kingdom: 
[I]f individuals followed their own reason in worshipping God, worshippers are so 
different from each other that they would judge each other’s worship to be unseemly or 
even impious; and would not accept that the others were worshipping God at all. And 
therefore it would not be worship, and even the worship most agreeable to reason would 
not be worship, because the nature of worship is to be a sign of inward honour, but a 
thing is only a sign if it makes something known to others.83  
 
Uniformity guarantees that acts intended to honor God are understood as such by others. Reason 
demands uniformity because, without it, individuals could not communicate signs of honor to 
God. Not surprisingly, Hobbes identifies the civil sovereign as the entity responsible for 
designating ‘signes of Honour’ that ‘ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their 
publique Worship’.84 Without civil laws governing worship, there would be disagreement over 
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what constitutes a sign of honor to God and no public worship. Leviathan-states therefore carry 
out the key function of ensuring public worship in God’s natural kingdom.  
The Leviathan-state also interprets the law of this kingdom, that is, the law of nature. In 
Leviathan, Hobbes makes this point prior to his chapter on the natural kingdom of God: ‘the 
Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority’—or the sovereign itself, as the Latin edition 
adds—determines the ‘Interpretation of the Law of Nature’.85 De Cive’s chapter on the natural 
kingdom of God is even more explicit in placing this responsibility with the civil sovereign: 
[T]he interpretation of natural laws, both sacred and secular, where God reigns through 
nature alone, depends on the authority of the commonwealth, i.e. of the man or council 
which has been granted sovereign power in the commonwealth; and whatever God 
commands, he commands through its voice. And, conversely, whatever commonwealths 
command both about the manner of worshipping God and about secular matters, is 
commanded by God.86  
 
So in the natural kingdom of God, whatever the civil sovereign commands is what God 
commands, and vice versa. That strong claim by Hobbes makes clear that people experience the 
natural kingdom of God through the Leviathan-state, which directly communicates to them this 
kingdom’s laws. 
 Hobbes’s conception of the natural kingdom of God functions as a remedy to what he 
sees as dangerous understandings of God’s kingdom. Catholic and Presbyterian conceptions of 
God’s kingdom pit the divine and civil law against one another. This conflict stems from the 
belief that the church represents God’s kingdom, a status that gives it spiritual authority. The 
consequent disputes over spiritual authority leave people confused about their obligations. 
Hobbes solves this dilemma by crafting a conception of God’s current kingdom that eliminates 
conflict between divine and civil commands. In Hobbes’s natural kingdom of God, individuals 
obey God through obeying their earthly sovereigns in civil and religious matters. By bringing 																																																								
85 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:430–31. 
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God’s kingdom and the Leviathan together in a unified whole, Hobbes aims to dispel the 
darkness in religion that causes political turmoil.  
Notably, Hobbes’s approach hangs onto the hope that, when properly understood, the 
doctrine of the kingdom of God can promote peace. He could have rejected that God’s kingdom 
currently exists, and left it at that. That is, God’s kingdom is a civil kingdom that existed in 
ancient Israel and will come again when Christ returns, which no one can predict. This 
interpretation neutralizes claims about representing God’s kingdom, while avoiding criticisms 
associated with equating imperfect commonwealths to God’s perfect kingdom. Yet Hobbes holds 
onto the tempting idea that God’s kingdom exists now. This decision perhaps reflects the 
importance he places on redirecting rather than dismissing his audience’s religious ideals.87 His 
reinterpretation of the natural kingdom of God certainly aligns with this strategy. When many 
were looking for God’s kingdom, Hobbes said it was before them: by obeying the civil 
sovereign, the (natural) kingdom of God could be theirs. 
 
6. Inconsistency in Hobbes’s accounts of the natural kingdom of God 
As above the textual evidence shows, Hobbes sees the Leviathan-state as a manifestation of the 
natural kingdom of God. Yet the exact nature of this relationship is not always clear from 
Hobbes’s writings, and there are different ways to interpret the Leviathan: 
(1) Supplementary component of the natural kingdom of God—i.e., the Leviathan-state 
more fully realizes this kingdom but is not necessary for its existence; or 
 
(2) Constitutive component of the natural kingdom of God—i.e., the Leviathan-state is a 
necessary feature for this kingdom to exist  
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The first line of interpretation, defended by Howard Warrender, A.P. Martinich, and others,88 
characterizes Hobbes’s natural kingdom of God as existing since creation in both the state of 
nature and civil society. On this view, the civil sovereign interprets the law in God’s natural 
kingdom if the Leviathan-state exists, but the natural kingdom of God and natural law governing 
it remain in place in the state of nature. So though the Leviathan-state plays an important role in 
the natural kingdom of God, it is always a supplementary role. In contrast, the second line of 
interpretation sees the Leviathan-state as serving functions so necessary for the natural kingdom 
of God that, without it, this kingdom cannot properly be said to exist. The Leviathan-state 
constitutes the natural kingdom of God; when the former dissolves, so does the latter. 
 There are passages to support both interpretations. In support of (1), Hobbes sometimes 
describes God’s reign in his natural kingdom as being continuous. From ‘the very Creation’, he 
writes in Leviathan, ‘God [has] … reigned over all men naturally by his might’.89 This 
description stems from two positions held by Hobbes: God’s authority in his natural kingdom is 
grounded in his irresistible power;90 and God always has had this power.91 If the natural kingdom 
of God continuously exists, at least since creation, that suggests its existence regardless of 
whether a civil commonwealth is in place.  
In other places, though, Hobbes says that God’s power alone is insufficient to establish 
his natural kingdom, which has implications that potentially support (2). For God to ‘properly … 
Raigne’, says Hobbes, his subjects must clearly understand his laws.92 Leviathan’s chapter on the 
natural kingdom of God states: ‘To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly 																																																								
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known; for else they are no Lawes: for to the nature of Lawes belongeth a sufficient and clear 
Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of Ignorance’.93 In the prophetic kingdom of 
God, miracles make prophecy known as God’s law. Supernatural signs are unnecessary in the 
natural kingdom of God because individuals can grasp its laws through reason alone.94 But 
though the law of nature should be manifestly known does not mean it is. Self-interested 
interpretations of the law of nature create confusion over its meaning, making it ‘of all Laws the 
most obscure’.95 In De Cive, Hobbes raises this concern when discussing the natural kingdom of 
God: ‘[A]s anyone may make a mistake in reasoning, and consequently men may hold 
conflicting opinions about most actions … whom did God will to be the interpreter of right 
reason, i.e. of his laws?’ Hobbes responds, as discussed above, that whatever God commands he 
commands through the civil sovereign’s voice.96 Similarly, in the Latin Leviathan, Hobbes notes 
that ‘few … know how to look into their own hearts and read [the natural law] written there’, so 
instead they learn it ‘from the written laws’.97 Given the risk of confusion over the law of nature, 
the civil sovereign must provide an authoritative interpretation that makes it manifestly known. 
Without the Leviathan-state, the law governing the natural kingdom of God—the law of nature—
lacks clarity. Hobbes has concerns whether a kingdom whose law is plagued by ambiguity is 
properly a kingdom. After all, if an essential function of government is interpreting law, and the 
entity responsible for that function is missing, does the government truly exist?  
 These competing views over how to interpret Hobbes’s natural kingdom of God relate 
closely to disputes over his theory of obligation. If the natural kingdom of God also exists 
outside civil commonwealths, its law—the law of nature—remains in force and obligates in the 																																																								
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state of nature.98 If, on the other hand, the natural kingdom of God only exists where there is a 
civil sovereign to interpret its law, the natural law governing this kingdom fails to be in force and 
obligate in the state of nature.99  
Interpreters sharply disagree over which of these two accounts is correct, partly due to 
ambiguities in Hobbes’s descriptions of the law of nature. In Leviathan, Hobbes uses the term 
‘law’ when enumerating the laws of nature and calls them ‘Immutable and Eternal’,100 which 
seems to suggest they are laws and always in effect. But after listing the laws of nature in chapter 
15, Hobbes concludes with a statement marked by equivocation: ‘These dictates of Reason, men 
use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theorems 
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves…. But yet if we 
consider the same Theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all 
things, then are they properly called Lawes’.101 Depending on which half of the passage is 
emphasized, it can count as evidence for either side of the debate over how to interpret the laws 
of nature in Hobbes’s thought.102 Then in chapter 26 of Leviathan, Hobbes suggests that the laws 
of nature lack the force of law prior to the commonwealth. Discussing the relationship between 
the civil and natural law, Hobbes writes that the laws of nature are ‘actually Lawes’ only when ‘a 
Common-wealth is once settled … and not before’.103 
 Such contradictory statements pose challenges for interpreters. Since these 
inconsistencies occur within a single work, even individual chapters, it makes little sense to 
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explain them as stemming from developments in Hobbes’s thought over time. With that path 
closed off, there is a tendency to argue that one interpretation is incompatible with Hobbes’s 
overall political philosophy, and therefore must be rejected as his considered view.104 That 
approach, though, puts interpreters in the tenuous position of trying to explain away a host of 
passages contrary to whichever position they defend.  
I would like to suggest that a more promising approach lies in examining how the 
coexistence of conflicting accounts of the natural kingdom of God and law of nature may 
advance Hobbes’s overall project. Contradictions sometimes suggest carelessness, but they also 
can show where a thinker’s priorities lie. When discussing the kingdom of God, on some points 
Hobbes wavers while on others he remains firm. With regards to the latter, he is most emphatic 
about stressing the dangers of the Catholic and Presbyterian doctrine of equating the church with 
God’s kingdom. Hobbes develops an alternative in which the current form of God’s kingdom is 
the natural kingdom of God. His inconsistent accounts of this kingdom suggest that he places a 
higher priority on persuading readers to reject the Catholic and Presbyterian view than on getting 
them to accept all the details of his alternative. Perhaps the natural kingdom of God exists in the 
state of nature, or perhaps it doesn’t. Either view is compatible with the civil sovereign’s 
authority over religious matters, and ultimately Hobbes makes some room for both in his 
political philosophy. What is important from his perspective is that, when civil subjects look for 
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God’s kingdom on earth, they look toward the Leviathan-state and recognize it as the entity that 
communicates God’s commands.  
This approach in describing God’s kingdom reflects a common strategy in Hobbes’s 
writings. As Kinch Hoekstra notes, Hobbes often is willing to appeal to different values and 
assumptions—even contradictory ones—in an effort to persuade a broad range of readers to 
accept those conclusions necessary for peace.105 For instance, Hobbes uses varied, sometimes 
inconsistent imagery when describing the state of nature. Rather than formulate an account of the 
state of nature consistent in all its details, he appears to place greater importance on using 
imagery that strikes fear in many different people and motivates them to obey the sovereign.106  
A similar mindset appears to guide Hobbes’s theory of obligation. Many have tried to 
explain what, according to Hobbes, propels individuals in the state of nature to overcome their 
distrust toward one another, cooperate, and institute a commonwealth. For Hobbes, though, 
explaining the details of this transition appears to have been a far less central concern.107 At the 
end of Leviathan, he notes that ‘there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose 
beginnings can in conscience be justified’.108 On his view, commonwealths almost always 
emerge by force and acquisition, not by individuals freely coming together to institute one.109 
Coercive power is what allows people to exit the state of nature.110 This dim view regarding the 
prospects of instituting a commonwealth may help explain inconsistencies in his accounts of the 
law of nature. Determining whether this law obligates in the state of nature is not Hobbes’s 
primary goal—it is persuading individuals that the civil law does obligate. Readers can take 																																																								
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different views on the law of nature’s obligations outside the commonwealth, as long as they 
recognize their duty to obey the civil law. Rather than provide a detailed blueprint for instituting 
a commonwealth, Hobbes puts more emphasis on why subjects must preserve a commonwealth 
by obeying their civil sovereign. The Catholic and Presbyterian understandings of God’s 
kingdom stand in the way of that goal for Hobbes, and thus he points his readers toward safer 
alternatives. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Hobbes wrote Leviathan deeply concerned about the doctrine of the kingdom of God being 
abused to justify rebellion. Neutralizing this danger required a new understanding of God’s 
kingdom. Hobbes offers that in chapter 31 of Leviathan and chapter 15 of the earlier De Cive. In 
contrast to the prevailing view at the time, he closely identifies the natural kingdom of God—the 
only form God’s kingdom can now take, according to Hobbes—with the Leviathan-state. By 
making this connection, Hobbes reinterprets the kingdom of God so that it no longer divides 
subjects’ loyalties. God’s present kingdom is not distinct from the commonwealth but one with 
it. With this interpretation, Hobbes aims to transform the doctrine of the kingdom of God into 
one that bolsters the civil sovereign’s authority and promotes peace. 
 
 
